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SECTION RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS

American Bar Association
Section of International
Law and Practice
Report to the House of Delegates
Repeal of the U.S. Trade Representative
Amendment*
RECOMMENDATION
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges the Government
of the United States to proceed as follows:
I. Congress should avoid statutory provisions that disqualify senior executive
or judicial appointees on the basis of clients they have previously represented.
II. Congress and the Administration should continue to utilize traditional mechanisms (including the Senate's power of confirmation), rather than special
pre- or post-employment rules, to ensure that senior executive and judicial
positions are filled only by highly qualified persons who will fulfill the
responsibilities of their positions with complete integrity.

*This Recommendation and Report was approved by the House of Delegates in February 1997.
Leonard M. Shambon and John R. Magnus were the principle authors of this Recommendation
and Report for the International Trade Committee, co-chaired by Edward J. Krauland and G. Hamilton
Loeb.
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III. Ethics-in-government rules, whether addressed to pre- or post-government
employment activities, should not single out foreign policy or trade functions
for special, restrictive treatment. Congress should repeal the 1995 amendments to 18 U.S.C. §207 and 19 U.S.C. §2171(b), whose effect is to restrict
the pre- and post-employment activities of U.S. Trade Representatives
("USTRs") and Deputy USTRs on behalf of foreign interests, and should
not extend those provisions to cover other senior government positions.
REPORT
I. Introduction
On July 24, 1995, while debating the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995
("LDA'"),'the Senate accepted an amendment creating a new restriction on who
could serve as United States Trade Representative ("USTR") or Deputy USTR. 2
Specifically, the statute defining the positions of USTR and Deputy USTR, 19
U.S.C. § 2171(b), was amended to disqualify from eligibility anyone who at any
time in the past had directly represented, aided or advised a foreign government or
political party in a trade negotiation or trade dispute with the United States. A
related section of the LDA created new restrictions on the post-employment
conduct of persons who have served as USTR or Deputy USTR. Prior law had
contained a special restriction, enacted in 1992, against a former USTR's representing, aiding or assisting any foreign government within three years of having
served as USTR.3 The LDA extended the ban's duration to a lifetime ban and
its coverage to include Deputy USTRs.
The Senate accepted these two provisions (hereinafter the "USTR Amendment, " reproduced in full at Appendix I to this Report) virtually without debate,
and the provisions passed the House after some unsuccessful attempts to expand
their reach. The President signed the Lobbying Disclosure Act, including the
USTR Amendment, while recognizing the Justice Department's concern that the
new pre-government employment restrictions may unconstitutionally impinge on
the President's appointments power. In 1996, more bills were introduced to
expand these restrictions to other government officials, but none were enacted.
The American Bar Association ("ABA") urges repeal of the USTR Amendment. While both the pre- and post-employment restrictions are objectionable,
as discussed below, it is the pre-employment disqualification that raises the most
serious issues, and it is this provision that most urgently should be repealed. The
provision sets a dangerous precedent for limiting the availability of qualified
candidates to serve in the U.S. Government. It automatically disqualifies potential

1. Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (1995).
2. See 141 CONG. REC. S10560-61 (daily ed. July 24, 1995).
3. Pub. L. No. 102-395, 106 Stat. 1873, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 207(f)(2).
VOL. 31, NO. 3

RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS

913

nominees solely based on a prior relationship with a particular type of client.
Such a rule, which effectively equates an advocate's personal views with those
of his or her client, reflects an unwarranted and incorrect view of the lawyer/
client relationship, especially in view of the ethical obligations of lawyers and
the constitutionally recognized right to counsel. In addition, such a rule takes
no account of the nature, length, significance or contemporaneity of the relationship with the former client. With regard to the new lifetime post-employment
restrictions for USTRs and Deputy USTRs, there has been no demonstration that
such a ban is needed to address any real problem, and there are compelling
reasons not to restrict the post-employment conduct of trade negotiators in such
an unusual and severe manner.
In sum, this Report supports the accompanying ABA resolution urging that
the Congress: avoid enacting disqualifications for service in the U.S. Government
which presume that lawyers and other advisors take on the views of their clients;
avoid singling out foreign policy and trade functions for extra-restrictive pre- or
post-government employment rules; and promptly repeal the USTR Amendment.
II. The Pre-Employment Restrictions
The new pre-employment restriction is unique among provisions in the U.S.
Code creating "primary officers" of the U.S. Government (i.e., positions requiring nomination by the President and the advice and consent of the Senate). Of
the hundreds of appointees in this category, only USTR and Deputy USTR candidates can be disqualified based solely on the identity of their former clients.
There is a serious constitutional objection to this new pre-employment restriction, in that it infringes on the President's appointments power. The ABA notes,
but does not rest its concerns on, that objection. The new pre-employment restriction is also troubling on several policy grounds: (1) it arbitrarily limits the flexibility of the President to choose, and the Senate to confirm, the best possible person
for a particular government position; (2) it presumes, without justification, that
a person advising a foreign government personally embraces and retains views
antithetical to those of the U.S. Government; (3) it creates perverse anomalies
unconnected to any legitimate interest in ensuring the loyalty of senior appointees;
and (4) comparable disqualifications could easily be enacted, based on the same
flawed rationale, for other government positions.
A.

THE NEW DISQUALIFICATION Is OF DOUBTFUL CONSTITUTIONALITY

As mentioned above, there is virtually no legislative history accompanying the
USTR Amendment and thus, unlike the debate surrounding provisions restricting
post-government employment activities, no discussion by the Congress of the
legality of the new pre-employment restriction. As also noted above, before the
USTR Amendment there were no statutory provisions disqualifying any class of
persons from service as USTR or Deputy USTR.
FALL 1997
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It is well accepted that the Congress has the constitutional responsibility for
creating the various government offices not specifically enumerated in the Constitution.4 Further, it is well accepted that the Congress can attach qualifications
to those government offices:
While Congress may not appoint those who execute the laws, it may lay down
qualifications of age, experience, and so on. Sometimes these qualifications significantly
narrow the field of choice. However, any Congressionally imposed qualifications must
have a reasonable relation to the office. Otherwise, Congress would be, in effect,
creating the appointing power in Congress, rather than in the President.
Congress may, in short, create the office but may not appoint the officer. To 5distinguish between these two powers, the Court has developed a germaneness test.
The Department of Justice articulated just such serious constitutional concerns
with the USTR Amendment as it relates to the President's appointments power:
The Department of Justice has long opposed broad restrictions on the President's constitutional prerogative to nominate persons of his choosing to senior executive branch
positions. The restriction in the bill is particularly problematic because it operates in
an area in which the Constitution commits special responsibility to the President, who
"is the constitutional representative of the United States in its dealings with foreign
nations." See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 35 (1960). The officers

in question perform diplomatic functions as the direct representative of the President,
a fact that Congress itself has recognized by providing that they should enjoy the rank
of ambassador. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(b). Regardless of whether the President would, as
a policy matter, be willing to accept this particular restriction, Congress would exceed
its constitutionally assigned role by setting such a broad disqualification. See, e.g.,
Civil Service Commission, 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 516, 520-21 (1871).6
After passage of the Lobbying Disclosure Act by both the Senate and the House,
Justice continued to express serious concerns about the new pre-employment
provision, but did not recommend that the President veto the Act on this basis. 7
The President in signing the bill noted the constitutional issue. 8
The new disqualification raises serious separation of powers questions. When
such provisions are enacted without hearings, with virtually no floor debate or
legislative history, and despite constitutional objections noted by the Department
of Justice, the justifications underlying them should be carefully examined. Where
such provisions are not only constitutionally suspect but also premised on a

4. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 244 (2d ed. 1988)
(analyzing the wording of Art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
5. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 265 (5th ed. 1995) (footnotes omitted).
6. Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S.
Department of Justice to the Hon. Henry Hyde, Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary,

concerning S. 1060 [the Senate bill pending before the House] 2-3 (Nov. 7, 1995).
7. Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S.
Department of Justice to the Hon. Alice M. Rivlin, Director, Office of Management and Budget,

concerning S. 1060 2 (Dec. 18, 1995).
8. See 51 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 2205-06 (December 25, 1995).
VOL. 31, NO. 3
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mistaken and troublesome view of the lawyer-client relationship, they should be
removed.
B. IT Is

IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST FOR THE PRESIDENT TO BE FREE TO

APPOINT THE MOST HIGHLY QUALIFIED NOMINEES, REGARDLESS OF
PAST CLIENTS

The new disqualification rules out many qualified individuals who could otherwise serve the nation effectively as senior trade negotiators. The best qualified
candidate for a particular USTR or Deputy USTR appointment may be someone
who has some experience advising foreign clients. (We note, in this regard, the
adage that it is useful for a prosecutor to have experience serving as defense
counsel.) Yet, the USTR Amendment would prevent such a person from serving.
While it is wrong to presume a link between advocacy and personal belief, it
is even more wrong to freeze such a presumption into a statute. Categorical and
difficult-to-amend statutory disqualifications cannot take into account the nuances
of a particular candidate's history. These are precisely the factors that the President should weigh in choosing a nominee and the Senate should review in the
confirmation process.
The new disqualification does not only restrict the President's appointments
power. It also represents a failure to respect the Senate's constitutional role to
consider, and where appropriate disapprove, the President's nominees. The Senate should preserve its prerogative to consider a particular nominee's record of
advocacy for foreign clients, or foreign government clients, in the confirmation
process and to determine whether anything in that record is sufficiently troubling
to justify withholding confirmation. 9
9. The unwarranted breadth of the new disqualification is demonstrated by the more narrowly
drawn alternatives that Congress did not select. Even assuming arguendo that assertive use of the
Senate's confirmation authority is insufficient, narrower solutions are available. One is mandatory
recusal with penalties for failure to do so, combined with strict reporting of prior activities. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 528 (Justice Department employees). Recent USTR and Deputy USTR nominees
have disclosed prior representations, including foreign representations, and have voluntarily recused
themselves (temporarily or permanently, as appropriate) with respect to issues involving those particular clients. Hearing to consider nomination of Michael Kantor Before Senate Comm. on Finance,
103 rd Cong., I st Sess. (1993); Nomination of CarlaAnderson Hills: Before Senate Comm. on Finance,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Nominations of Rufus Hawkins Yerxa, Charlene Barshefsky, Walter
Broadnex, Avis Lavelle, Jerry Klegner, David Ellwood, Kenneth Apfel, Bruce Vladeck, Hariet Rabb
and Jean Hanson: Before Senate Comm. on Finance, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Other trade
officials have done likewise. See, e.g., Rick Jenkins, "Trade Nomination Raises 'Revolving Door'
Issue," Christian Science Monitor at 8 (Jan. 14, 1994). Another alternative is more extensive mandatory reporting of pre-employment activities over a set period before Senate confirmation, enhancing
the Senate's ability to reject a nominee based on prior activities if it wishes. See, e.g., Hearings on
S. 555 (Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977, Blind Trusts and Other Conflict of Interest Matters)
Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 108-09 (1977) (testimony
of Fred Wertheimer, Vice President for Operations, Common Cause). Requiring disclosure of clients
is not without its problems. As noted by the ABA in 1977, such a regime could place a professional
person in the position of having to violate the confidentiality of a privileged relationship. See Financial
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THE UNSTATED PREMISE OF THE NEW DISQUALIFICATION-THAT AN
ADVOCATE IS EITHER TAINTED BY OR CONTINUOUSLY CAPTIVE TO THE
INTERESTS OF A FORMER CLIENT-IS INCONSISTENT WITH U.S.
TRADITIONS AND VALUES

During the 1974 Senate consideration of legislation to establish the office of
special prosecutor and to depoliticize the position of Attorney General, former
Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg described the attorney-client relationship
in the following manner:1 °
One of the traditional concepts applicable to the bar at large is too often overlooked
in senatorial confirmation hearings involving nominees for Attorney General, Assistant
Attorney General, Deputy, and U.S. Attorneys. That concept-which I fear, Mr. Chairman, in the day of the organization man and big interests which lawyers are called
upon to serve, is too often overlooked-is that the bar is independent, that it is not a
servant of a client, but services a client; and that the men and women of the bar are
independentand give counsel and advise independently. The principal law enforcement
officers of the Government should be lawyers in that sense ..... Any nominee of a

different mind or character should not be confirmed by the Senate.
For just such reasons, it is widely accepted that a lawyer should not be ineligible
for nomination as a judge solely because of past representation of, for example,
criminal defendants.
The USTR Amendment, and the proposals to extend the disqualification so
that it applies to other government positions, adopts a different and inaccurate
view of the relationship between advocates and their clients. It is wrong to assume
that an outside advisor, such as a lawyer, necessarily concurs with the views or
actions of his or her client, or will apply those views in carrying out the duties
of a public office. Certainly, if someone represents more than one group of
clients-for example, foreign governments in some matters and U.S. corporations
in others-it cannot fairly be presumed that the foreign government representation
determines or more accurately represents the person's own beliefs.
When an individual leaves the private sector and becomes a government official, he or she takes on totally new responsibilities and must move beyond all
prior client interests-those of domestic and foreign clients alike. Other than
preserving their confidences, an appointee has no continuing obligation to prior

clients. The USTR Amendment wrongly ignores this aspect of public service.
Reflecting its inconsistency with U.S. traditions and values, the new disqualifi-

DisclosureAct: Hearingson H.R. 1, H.R. 9, H.R. 6954, and CompanionBillsBefore the Subcommittee
on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 487, 490 (1977) (testimony of Prof. Livingston Hall and Prof. Herbert S. Miller
on behalf of the American Bar Association).
10. Removing Politicsfrom the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803, S. 2978 Before
the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 62 (1974) (emphasis added).
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cation is utterly without precedent in the U.S. Code. Appendix 2 to this Report
identifies 126 statutory provisions, relating to U.S. Government civilian offices,
that impose qualifications in addition to Senate confirmation. " As shown there,
those 126 provisions fall into seven groupings:
" Three provisions requiring that appointees be U.S. citizens;
* Nineteen provisions requiring that appointees be civilians at the time of their
appointment;
__
provisions that establish minimum representation on a board or commission of certain constituent groups;
__
provisions requiring technical expertise;
* Six provisions imposing "cooling off' periods to ensure civilian control of
the military;
* Seven provisions imposing other temporary "cooling off' periods (e.g.,
sitting members of the U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors may not
simultaneously be representatives of "special interests using the Postal Service");
* Two provisions containing permanent, uncurable, disqualifications. Of
these, only the USTR disqualification is based on advocacy activities. The
other provides that members of the permanent board of the Federal Agriculture Mortgage Corporation shall not be, or have been, officers or directors
of a financial institution.
*

D.

THE NEW DISQUALIFICATION CREATES PERVERSE ANOMALIES

Before the USTR Amendment, there were no statutory qualifications upon
who could be nominated and confirmed to serve as USTR or Deputy USTR. Not
even U.S. citizenship, or a record free of criminal behavior, was (or is) statutorily
required. Thus, the effect of the new pre-government employment restriction is
that a non-citizen, a felon or even a juvenile could in principle be nominated
and confirmed as USTR, while a highly skilled trade specialist who briefly advised
a foreign government twenty years ago could not.
Such a rule could also deprive the nation of highly skilled and effective public
servants. Had it been in effect at the time, the USTR Amendment might have
disqualified one of President Reagan's USTRs, Dr. Clayton K. Yeutter, for
activities that apparently did not dominate his pre-government professional

11. These are all the provisions that could be identified through review of the U.S. Code, 1994
Edition, and Supplement I to that Edition. Some of these positions are also subject to statutory
requirements designed to ensure a balance of political affiliation on Boards and Commissions, e.g.,
an equal number of Democrats and Republicans on the U.S. International Trade Commission. Additionally, in some cases an office is required by statute to be filled by an existing federal, state or
local government official. Appendix II largely ignores such requirements.
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work. 2 Extending the principle, as some have proposed, to representing, aiding
or advising foreign private companies might have disqualified President Bush's
USTR, Carla Hills. 3 Again, to the extent that questions arise in a particular case
about the overlap between prior advocacy efforts and the advocate's own current
beliefs, such questions can be effectively explored during the Senate confirmation
process.
Broad and seemingly arbitrary interpretations of the USTR Amendment are
possible given the lack of definitions, in either the statute or the legislative history,
for crucial and open-ended terms such as, but not limited to, "aided" and "advised." For example, if a Senator meets with foreign government officials in
an attempt to find a mutually advantageous solution to a particular bilateral trade
dispute, it could be argued that he or she has "aided" or "advised" the foreign
government in such a manner as to trigger disqualification from future service
as USTR. On the other hand, it has been observed that the USTR Amendment
would not prevent appointment of a corporate executive who, in order to increase
profits at his ailing company, negotiates an enormous tax subsidy from a foreign
government in order to move parts of his factory abroad and subsequently fires
hundreds of his U.S. workers.' 4
E.

THE NEW DISQUALIFICATION SETS AN UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT FOR
OTHER GOVERNMENT POSITIONS

A significant danger of the USTR Amendment is that the same principle could
be applied to other government positions involving disciplines other than international trade negotiation. Persons could be disqualified, by statute, from being
federal judges because they had at some time in their past represented criminal
defendants, even if their representations had been the result of occasional court
appointment. Positions at the Environmental Protection Agency could be conditioned, by statute, on never having represented, aided or assisted clients in favor
of, or opposed to, toxic dump cleanup. Positions at the Department of Energy
could be conditioned, by statute, on never having represented, aided or assisted
clients in favor of, or opposed to, offshore drilling. Positions at the Consumer
Product Safety Commission could be conditioned, by statute, on never having
12. Dr. Yeutter had served on the board of directors of the Swiss Commodities and Futures
Association and had been the first American businessman invited to Japan (in 1982) under a Japanese
government program to improve trade relations with the United States. See Hearingon the Nomination
of Dr. Clayton K. Yeutter Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1985)
(vita submitted on behalf of Dr. Yeutter).
13. According to third-party testimony at the time of her appointment, Ambassador Hills had
previously been registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act as an agent for Daewoo Industrial Co. See Hearing on the Nomination of Carla Anderson Hills Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 32, 51 (1989) (testimony of Anthony Harrigan, President, U.S.
Business and Industrial Council).
14. See Donald DeKieffer, The 1995 "Irrelevant QualificationsAct," JOURNAL OF COMMERCE
at 7A (Dec. 30, 1996).
VOL. 31, NO. 3
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represented, aided or assisted clients supporting, or opposing, specific product
liability actions. More broadly, anyone who has given advice to entities in a
regulated industry could be disqualified from putting his or her expertise to use
as a regulator in that industry. Such a rule would dramatically restrict the pool
of qualified regulators.
The ABA historically has advanced the view that rigid (i.e., statutory) preemployment restrictions for government appointments should be avoided. For
example, in the wake of the perceived politicization of Justice Department functions during the Watergate period, during consideration of what eventually became the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, the ABA was asked to comment
on possible eligibility restrictions for senior law enforcement positions:
Question. There have been many recommendations to set the statutory requirements
for appointees to the Offices of Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Director
of the FBI, and others. Do you generally believe it is a good idea to set rigid eligibility
standards by statute, considering that many highly qualified individuals would be arbitrarily excluded from consideration by such standards? If so, what sorts of standards
would you suggest?
Answer. The ABA has not suggested rigid standards for appointment to any of the
above-mentioned positions nor does it believe rigid standards are advisable. 5
The USTR Amendment, by contrast, fails the test of narrow drafting and
scope. It reaches backward in time without limit, disqualifying otherwise qualified
candidates by reason of any covered representation or assistance at any earlier
point in their careers. The amendment reaches candidates who agreed to assist
foreign governments with no idea that doing so might preclude later public service.
The amendment applies not to a carefully circumscribed category of activities,
but to any representation or assistance, whether significant or insignificant, to
any foreign government on any trade "negotiation" or "dispute" involving the
United States. Finally, the amendment confuses the advocate's required role with
his or her personal views.
III. The Post-Employment Restrictions
A.

POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS OF GENERAL APPLICATION

There have been restrictions on the post-employment activities of various categories of federal workers since 1872.16 The earliest versions approximating the
current provisions were adopted in 1962, as part of an overall revision of the
15. Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 495 Before the Senate
Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 174 (1976) (testimony of William
B. Spann, Jr., President-Elect Nominee of the American Bar Association and Chairman, American
Bar Association Special Committee to Study Federal Law Enforcement Agencies). The ABA did
recommend limited measures to address perceived problems of politicization of the Department of
Justice. See also id. at 270-71, 295, 298.
16. See S. REP. No. 99-396, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1986); S. REP. No. 100-101, 100th

Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1987).
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conflict-of-interest statutes. 17 In short, a full and generally effective array of
government-wide post-employment restrictions has been in place for many years.
Those restrictions, subjected to substantial revision and fine-tuning in the Ethics
in Government Act of 1978"8 and the Ethics Reform Act of 1989,'9 include:
* a lifetime ban on appearing before or communicating with any U.S. Government body on behalf of a party other than the United States, on matters in
"participated personally and substantially" while a federal
which the official
20
employee;
* a two-year ban on appearing or communicating with any U.S. Government
body on behalf of a party other than the United States on matters that were
her official responsibility in the year prior to departure
pending under his2or
1
from the agency;
" a one-year ban for enumerated senior officials on all substantive contact
with the former agency on behalf of a party other than the United States,
which for Cabinet officers and certain other very senior officials extends
to contacts with specified top officers of other agencies as well; 22 and
" a one-year ban prohibiting senior officials of all departments and agencies
from (i) representing the interests of a foreign government or political party
before any agency or department or (ii) aiding or advising a foreign government or political party with the intent to influence a decision of any department or agency. 23
The last of these provisions, a special rule against senior officials' representing
or advising foreign governments, drew a number of policy and constitutional
objections prior to and at the time of its enactment.24 This Report does not address

17. Prior provisions had barred former employees from prosecuting claims against the United
States for two years after terminating government employment. See H. REP. No. 748, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2-4 (1961).
18. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1864-66 (1978).
19. Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716-24 (Nov. 30, 1989).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1996).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2).
22. 18 U.S.C. §§ 207(c), (d).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 207(f).
24. H. REP. No. 1068, 100thCong.,2dSess. 13 (1988) (regarding H.R. 5043);Post-Employment
Conflicts of Interest: Hearingson H. R. 5097andRelated Bills Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
79-80 (1986) (testimony of John C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice, on legislation leading up to the 1989 Act, arguing that post-employment
restrictions could prohibit representations which were in the national interest). Similar views were
forwarded by the ACLU, which maintained that a statute prohibiting the representation of foreign
interests regulated political activity and, to be upheld, must withstand strict judicial scrutiny. See
Post-Employment Restrictions for Federal Officers and Employees: Hearings on H.R. 2267 and
Related Bills Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 200, 204-06 (1989). See also Appendix III
to this Report.
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the propriety of a broad, government-wide, one-year ban on post-employment
activity for foreign governments. It is noteworthy, however, that this provision
was justified against due process attack on the ground that it presented no absolute
bar to pursuit of employment by covered officials, but "merely imposed a waiting
period" of one year.25
These post-employment restrictions establish a comprehensive set of rules that
apply across the board to federal officials and employees in all agencies and
departments. For the most part, these rules appear to have worked successfully.26
They apply with full force to USTRs and Deputy USTRs, and thereby provide
a solid framework for protecting the public interest in regulating the postemployment activity of persons who occupy those positions.
B.

SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON SENIOR TRADE NEGOTIATORS

Beginning in 1992 and by expansion in the 1995 USTR Amendment, Congress
created a special rule that singles out former USTRs and Deputy USTRs for
special, more restrictive treatment than other, similarly-situated, former senior
officials. Congress did so with virtually no meaningful deliberation or explanation. It is the ABA's view that, in so doing, Congress created a separate category
of post-employment treatment for the senior U.S. trade officials that cannot be
justified and should be eliminated.
The first step along this path occurred in 1992, when Congress, as part of an
appropriations bill, enacted a new Section 207(f)(2) which lengthened to three
years the foreign entity ban as it applied to the USTR. 27 The Senate report describing this provision contained no meaningful explanation or justification of the
longer period.28 In signing the bill, President Bush took strong objection, noting
that the change had been passed without any public discussion of the merits,
without consideration of its relationship to the comprehensive amendments passed
in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, and without evaluation of "the implications
of targeting for coverage just one position." 2 9 President Bush signed the bill
because it was a necessary funding measure.
Continuing this pattern of acting without legislative hearings or development,
the 1995 USTR Amendment enlarged this special USTR restriction to a lifetime
ban, and expanded the ban to cover Deputy USTRs as well as USTRs. Like the
initial 1992 creation of the special post-employment rule for USTRs-and unlike
25. S. REP. No. 101, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1987).
26. The ABA may, of course, have occasion in the future to comment or suggest improvements
that would enhance the effectiveness of these rules. That is not the subject of this Report.
27. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1993, Section 609, Pub. L. No. 102-395, 106 Stat. 1828, 1873 (1992).
28. See S. REP. No. 102-331, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1992).
29. 28 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1874 (Oct. 12, 1992) (statement by President George Bush upon signing H.R. 5678).
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the broadly-applicable post-employment rules of the Ethics in Government Act
of 1978 or the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, each of which underwent extensive
legislative consideration-the USTR Amendment did so without any meaningful
legislative background.
This action raises serious legal and policy questions. In departing from
the "waiting period" rationale that underlay the general one-year ban on
representation of foreign governments in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989,30
the new lifetime ban raises the very constitutional questions that led the Justice
Department and other witnesses to express concern during the 1989 reform
legislation. One of the bills leading to the 1989 Act contained a lifetime ban
on certain high ranking officials representing or advising foreign entities. In
hearings on that bill, a Justice Department spokesman agreed that the lifetime
ban raised a serious constitutional problem. 3' Another Justice Department
official doubted that reducing the ban to 10 years would remove the constitutional problem. 32 Commenting on a substitute version of the bill, a spokesperson for Common Cause agreed with shifting away from a lifetime ban on
representing foreign governments in favor of a shorter period. While believing
that the period for the ban should be longer than for other representations,
Common Cause was "very troubled by a lifetime ban and would not recommend that." 33 Others testified that even a 10-year ban was too long.34 The
ACLU suggested that "[a]t the very least such a prohibition should expire if
the party controlling the White House changes in the interim."35
More importantly, no persuasive rationale has been advanced for applying
special rules to senior trade officials. Former USTRs were barred by pre-1992
law, for example:
* from ever assisting foreign governments in any matter in which they had
36
direct involvement while in government;
" from communicating with USTR officials on any policy issue for a period
37
of one year;

30. See supra note 25.
31. Integrity in Post Employment Act of 1986: Hearings on S. 2334 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38, 41-43, 66 (1986) (testimony of John C. Keeney,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
32. Id. at 87-88 (testimony of Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal
Division, Department of Justice).
33. See id. at 179 (testimony of Ann McBride, Senior Vice President, Common Cause); PostEmployment Conflicts of Interest: Hearings on H.R. 5097and Related Bills Before the Subcommittee
on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 103-04 (1986) (testimony of Ann McBride, Senior Vice President, Common Cause).
34. See id. at 183, 186 (testimony of Norman J. Ornstein, American Enterprise Institute).
35. Hearings on S.2334 (Integrity in Post Employment Act of 1986) Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1986) (testimony of Morton H. Halperin and Jerry J.
Berman on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1989).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 207(c).
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* from communicating with USTR officials within two years on any matter
that was active within USTR during the last year of the former USTR's
service; 3' and
* from appearing before any agency, within one year after leaving government,
on behalf of a foreign government or political party. 9
Taken together, these rules adequately protect against the possibility, and against
the appearanceof "influence peddling" or "misuse of inside information" by
former trade officials on behalf of foreign interests.
There are at least three other compelling reasons to repeal the new postemployment restrictions. First, the restrictions could easily hinder advancement of U. S. interests by diminishing the pool of qualified senior trade negotiator candidates. Among the factors cited in discouraging people from public
service are increasingly severe post-employment restrictions. Past USTRs and
Deputy USTRs have not made a full career of public service; like other senior
appointees, they have returned to their communities and their private practices
after serving in public office. Qualified candidates may decline to serve if
their livelihoods-often after a relatively short period of government servicewould thereby be materially jeopardized. Second, there has been no documented misconduct by former USTRs or Deputy USTRs which would justify
the new, heightened restrictions. Third, there is no principled reason to single
out trade negotiators; rather, the new restrictions simply penalize or demonize
the representation of foreigners. Other government officials-e.g., the Secretaries of Defense or Transportation, or the Attorney General-could just as
easily be subject to the same lifetime ban.
Meanwhile, there has been absolutely no showing that the general rules
applicable to all other government officials insufficiently protect the interests
of the United States. The public interest is in having nominees who become
public officials adhere to the highest standards while executing the duties of
their office. After someone leaves office, the government's interest is properly
limited to preventing the misuse of its confidential information and the misuse
of influence.4 °

38. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 207(0.
40. See Integrity in Post Employment Act of 1986: Hearings on S. 2334 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-80 (1986) (testimony of David H. Martin,
Director, Office of Government Ethics). The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") also
opined that the misuse of inside information should be the focus of ethics laws, rather than the
identity of the client. Id. at 198 (testimony of Morton H. Halperin and Jerry J. Berman on behalf of
the American Civil Liberties Union); Hearingson H.R. 2267andRelated Bills (Post-Employment
Restrictionsfor FederalOfficers and Employees) Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law
and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 200,
210-11 (1989).
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IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
For the reasons set out above, it is the view of the ABA that:
" Congress should avoid statutory provisions that disqualify senior executive
orjudicial appointees on the basis of clients they have previously represented.
" Congress and the Administration should continue to utilize traditional mechanisms (including the Senate's power of confirmation), rather than special
pre- or post-employment rules, to ensure that senior executive or judicial
positions are filled only by highly qualified persons who will fulfill the
responsibilities of their positions with complete integrity.
* Ethics-in-government rules, whether addressed to pre- or post-government
employment activities, should not single out foreign policy or trade functions
for special, restrictive treatment. Congress should repeal the 1995 amendments to 18 U.S.C. §207 and 19 U.S.C. §2171(b), whose effect is to restrict
the pre- and post-employment activities of U.S. Trade Representatives
("USTRs") and Deputy USTRs on behalf of foreign interests, and should
not extend those provisions to cover other senior government positions.

January 1997
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Respectfully submitted,
Lucinda A. Low
Chair

RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS

925

Appendix I. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Amendment
SEC. 21.

BAN ON TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

REPRESENTING OR

ADVISING FOREIGN ENTITIES

(a) Representing after Service.-Section 207(f(2) of title 18, United States Code,
is amended by(1) inserting "or Deputy United States Trade Representative" after "is the
United States Trade Representative"; and
(2) striking "within 3 years" and inserting "at any time."
(b) Limitation on Appointment as United States Trade Representative and Deputy
United States Trade Representative.-Section 141(b) of the Trade Act of 1974
(19 U.S.C. 2171(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
"(3) Limitation on Appointments.-A person who has directly represented,
aided, or advised a foreign entity (as defined by section 207(0(3) of
title 18, United States Code) in any trade negotiation, or trade dispute,
with the United States may not be appointed as United States Trade
Representative or as a Deputy United States Trade Representative."
(c) Effective Date.-The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect
to an individual appointed as United States Trade Representative or as a Deputy
United States Trade Representative on or after the date of enactment of this
Act.
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Appendix III. Post-Government Employment Restrictions:
A Selected "Ethics-in-Government" Legislative History
There have been restrictions on the post-employment activities of various categories
of federal workers since 1872.' The earliest versions approximating the current provisions
2
were adopted in 1962, as part of an overall revision of the conflict-of-interest statutes.
The 1962 amendments created two basic restrictions: one, a lifetime ban with regard to
matters in which the former official had been personally and substantially involved while
in government, the other, a two-year ban with regard to matters within the former official's
realm of official responsibility. Review of federal conflict-of-interest rules had begun in
earnest in 1957 by the House Committee on the Judiciary. 3 At that time, the Committee
staff summarized the underlying problem in the following manner:
The obligations of fidelity and confidentiality survive the termination of employment. On
the other hand, the skills and experience acquired over years of service as a Government
specialist not only legitimately belong to the employee, but often constitute his sole
stock in trade. Determination of the precise point at which legitimate utilization of
professional skill and experience is transformed into antisocial exploitation of "inside
information" and "influence" presents one of the outstanding dilemmas in this area. 4
These two themes-'"inside information" and "influence" -have remained constant
in the intervening years. For instance, in a 1978 revision of the law, entitled the "Ethics
in Government Act," the goals were summarized in the following manner:
Former officers should not be permitted to exercise undue influence over former colleagues, still in office, in matters pending before the agencies; they should not be
permitted to utilize information on specific cases gained during government service
for their own benefit and that of private clients. Both are forms of unfair advantage. 5
A detailed web of post-employment restrictions exists today, roughly divisible into
those which address "switching sides" and those which address "influence peddling."
As explained below, existing rules single out senior trade negotiators for special, restrictive
treatment. However, those rules are unwise and quite possibly unconstitutional, and the
USTR Amendment, by increasing such restrictions, goes even further in the wrong direction. Following is a short summary of the bans now in existence. 6

1. See S. REP. No. 396, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1986); S. REP. No. 101, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 8-9 (1987).
2. Prior provisions had barred former employees from prosecuting claims against the United
States for two years after terminating government employment. See H. REP. No. 748, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2-4 (1961).
3. The 1962 review was preceded by a two-year study by a special committee of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York completed in 1960, and then by the 1961 President's Special
Committee on Conflict of Interest, and it resulted in revised statutory provisions.
4. STAFF OF THE ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE (SUBCOMMITTEE No. 5) OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LEGISLATION, PT. 1,

at 4 (Comm. Print 1958).
5. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1977). See also Hearings on S. 2334 (Integrity
in Post Employment Act of 1986) Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.

79-80 (1986) (testimony of David H. Martin, Director, Office of Government Ethics).

6. This review does not focus on the penalties for violations. The ABA's concern is not so
much with mitigating the penalties applicable to USTR Amendment offenses but rather the underlying
legality and wisdom of singling out such activities and individuals.
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I. Restrictions of General Application
A.

SWITCHING SIDES: THE "PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INVOLVEMENT"

BANS

1. Representation and Appearance: Permanent Ban
Among the changes enacted in 1962, a new Section 207(a) of title 18 of the United
States Code contained a permanent ban on knowingly acting as agent or attorney for a
specific party in a particular matter in which the United States was a party or had a direct
and substantial interest and in which the former employee
participated personally and
7
substantially during his or her government employment.
In 1978, Congress through title V of the Ethics in Government Act expanded the
permanent ban to cover the additional activity of "or otherwise represent[ing] . . . in
any formal or informal appearance before, or, with the intent to influence, mak[ing] any
oral or written communication" to any Government body for a private party in a particular
matter in which the former employee participated personally and substantially. 8
In 1989, Congress enacted the Ethics Reform Act ("1989 Act"), title I of which
restructured and revised Section 207. Section 207(a)(1), as amended and as currently in
force, 9 contains a lifetime ban against "knowingly mak[ing], with the intent to influence,
any communication to or appearance before any officer or employee of any department
.. . in connection with a particular matter" involving specific parties and in which the
former employee had "participated personally and substantially."
2. Aid and Assistance: No General Ban
The Ethics in Government Act also created a two-year ban which prohibited a former
public servant from knowingly aiding, counseling, advising, consulting or assisting in a
representation in any matter in which that individual participated "personally and substantially" while in public service. The new provision was contained in Sections 207(b)(ii)
and (b)(3).' ° However, the 1989 Act dropped any general ban against aiding or advising
on such matters.
3. "Switching Sides" in Trade Negotiations
The 1989 Act created a new one-year ban affecting any former official who:
(1) personally and substantially participated in any ongoing trade or treaty negotiation
during his or her last year of government employment,
(2) had access to information about such negotiation which was exempt from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act, and
(3) was so designated by the appropriate government department or agency.
Under Section 207(b)(1) as currently in effect," such a former official, for one year
after employment, cannot on the basis of that information "knowingly represent, aid, or
advise" any other person about the negotiation. "Trade negotiation" is defined by Section
207(b)(2)(A) to mean negotiations initiated after the President determines to undertake
negotiations leading to a trade agreement pursuant to Section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (concerning authority to enter into certain trade
agreements with foreign countries, providing for the harmonization, reduction or elimina-

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119, 1123-24 (1962); 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1976).
Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1864-66 (1978); 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1988).
18 U.S.C. § 207 (1994).
Id.
Id.
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tion of trade barriers, including non-tariff barriers, under the "fast track" approval procedure).
Unlike the broad post-employment bans contained in the USTR Amendment, this particular restriction arguably falls within the traditional rules for "switching sides" and the
government's legitimate interest in preventing the misuse of information obtained during
government employment. One member of the 1989 President's Commission on Federal
Ethics Law Reform found this narrowly drawn one-year ban to be relatively unobjectionable. 2
B.

THE INFLUENCE PEDDLING BANS

1. The Two-Year "Official Responsibility" Ban
a. Representations and Appearances
Section 207(b), as enacted in 1962, contained a one-year ban on personally appearing
as agent or attorney in any matter in which the United States is a party or has a direct
and substantial interest and which was under the official responsibility of the former
employee during a one-year period before the termination of his or her federal employment. 13
In 1978, Congress through title V of the Ethics in Government Act extended the official
responsibility ban to a two-year ban on acting in the roles clarified under the new Section
207(a), namely knowingly acting as an agent, attorney or otherwise representing or communicating with any Government body. The revised provision was contained in Sections
207(b)(i) and (b)(3).'
In 1989, as part of the revision of Section 207, the two-year official responsibility ban
was moved to Section 207(a)(2) (where it remains) 15 and aligned with the new wording
on appearances, namely that the official was barred from "knowingly mak[ing], with the
intent to influence, any communication to or appearance before any officer or employee
of any department. . . in connection with a particular matter" involving specific parties
and pending under his or her official responsibility during the last year of employment.
b. Aid and Assistance: No General Ban After 1989 Revisions
Under the 1978 revisions, former officials had to wait for a two-year ban to run its
course before providing any aid and assistance on matters in which they were personally
and substantially involved while in office. 16 After two years had passed from their
termination of employment with the government, former officials were free to aid,
counsel, advise, consult or assist in such matters, so long as there was not a "formal
or informal" appearance before a federal agency or department. Under the 1989 revi-

12. See Hearings on H.R. 2267 and Related Bills (Post-Employment Restrictionsfor Federal
Officers and Employees) Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34 (1989) (testimony of R. James
Woolsey, Member, President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform).
13. Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119, 1123-24 (1962); 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1976); H. REP.
No. 748, supra note 2, 22-23; S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1962). The one year
prohibition regarding official responsibility matters was a Senate reduction of the House-passed
two-year ban. The Senate reduced the ban to one year in order to protect recruiting efforts of
government scientific agencies. See S. REP. No. 2213 at 13.
14. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1864-66 (1978); 18 U.S.C. § 207(b) (1988).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) (1994).
16. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1756, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1978).
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sion, there was no general ban on aid and assistance, other than the one-year trade
negotiation ban referenced above. 17
The underlying purpose of the two-year official responsibility ban has always been to
create a reasonable cooling off period for Cabinet officers and similar high ranking officials
for matters in which they had no direct participation. During the 1962 hearings on the
initial cooling off provision, the Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School
summarized the intent in the following way:
I think it is a practical proposition that [sic] if a man is not going to be in Government
service all his life, by and large; there are of course some people who make the Government service a career-but most of the top people in Government will not do so. A
man is going back into the general framework of the community. And, on balance,
there should not be too much limitation on what a man8 can do when he goes back into
the community. So it is a question of drawing a line.'
The Kennedy Administration, in its bill, actively opposed the inclusion of a proposal
along the lines addressed in the 1962 hearings.' 9 The American Bar Association agreed
with the Administration's position:
Now, we agree with Mr. Katzenbach in recommending the elimination of section 207(b)
of H.R. 8140, which would completely bar a former Government employee for 2 years
after termination of his employment from appearing before any court or agency in a
manner [sic] "which was under his official responsibility" during his employment.
And we agree with the Department of Justice that this subsectionwould unfairly impair the private employment opportunities of many non-career
Government officials who may have had responsibility for a broad area of Government
operation, but no personal or substantial participation in a vast number of particular
matters for which they were ultimately responsible.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, in many agencies the top officials or those close to the
top have a perfect flood of papers that float in front of them, so that they have to sign
merely in reliance on an OK by some subordinate. Some documents that they don't
even see are signed by subordinates. And this sort of official responsibility is simply
too large for the net to catch.
We concur with the Department of Justice that section 207(a) provides adequate protection for the Government, since it embodies the rule of ethics expressed in Canon 36
of the Canons of Professional Ethics, the rule against switching sides-this has worked
for generations in the law, and we think it would work equally well in Government.
And I think it would be unjust to preserve 207(b) with its vast "official responsibility,"
because many of the finest men that you have to draw into the Government never have

17. In short, the two-year assistance ban was reduced to one year, and was converted to apply
only with respect to an official who "personally and substantially participated in any ongoing trade
or treaty negotiation." See Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716, 1717 (1989); 18 U.S.C. § 207(b).
The former official could not provide aid and assistance to other persons for a year after leaving United
States government employment, on matters "concerning such ongoing trade or treaty negotiation." Id.
18. Hearings on H.R. 302, H.R. 3050, H.R. 3411, H.R. 3412, and H.R. 7139 (GeneralConflict
of Interest Legislation) Before the Antitrust Subcommittee (Subcommittee No. 5) of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 136-37, 142 (1961) (testimony of Jefferson B. Fordham,
Dean, University of Pennsylvania Law School).
19. See Hearingon H.R. 8140 (Conflicts of Interest) Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1962) (testimony of Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Deputy Attorney General).
FALL 1997

950

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

personal contacts with problems over which they have official responsibility, and it is
utterly unfair and unjust to them, and impairs recruitment of the ablest men.2°
2. For Senior Officials, A One-Year, Agency-Specific, No Contact Rule
a. Representations and Appearances
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 created a third prohibition, as new Section
207(c). It was a general one-year no contact rule for certain enumerated senior officials
with regard to their prior department or agency for any particular matter pending before
the agency during the cooling off period or of direct and substantial interest to the agency
during the cooling off period. 2'
The 1989 revisions aligned Subsection (c) with the new wording on appearances, namely
that the official was barred from "knowingly mak[ing], with the intent to influence, any
communication to or appearance before .. " The ban remained limited to the agency
where the former official worked one year before termination of his or her government
service. This no contact rule
now applied to any matter on which the former employee
22
sought "official action.'
b. Aid and Assistance: No General Ban
As referenced above in Part 1, the two-year general ban of the 1978 revision was
removed under the 1989 revisions, and replaced with a one-year trade and treaty negotiation
ban. After the expiration of the applicable period, the official remained free to aid, counsel,
advise, consult or assist in trade or treaty negotiation matters in which the official participated while in government service.
3. For Very Senior Officials, A Broader One-Year No Contact Rule
The 1989 legislation also created a new ban directed against Cabinet officers and other
very senior officials. For such officials, new Section 207(d) banned for one year following
employment any contact ("knowingly mak[ing], with the intent to influence, any communication to or appearance before ...")with (1) any employee of the former official's
agency during the last year of employment and (2) enumerated senior officials of any
other agency.23
II. The Special Ban on Representing, Aiding or Advising Foreign Governments
The 1989 Act also created new Section 207(f)(1), banning senior officials and very
senior officials (as defined in Sections 207(c) and (d)), for one year after leaving
government service, from (1) "represent[ing] the interests of a foreign entity" before
any department or agency "with the intent to influence a decision" or (2) "aid[ing]
or advisfing] a foreign entity with the intent to influence a decision" of any department

20. See id. at 53-55 (testimony of Raoul Berger, Chairman, Section of Administrative Law,
American Bar Association). Reproducing this 1962 testimony should not be taken as an indication
that the ABA continues to oppose "official responsibility" bans, which have now been a feature of
the landscape for many years.
21. See CoNF. REP. No. 1756, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 74-77 (1978).
22. The no contact rule continues to apply in the same manner. 18 U.S.C. § 207(c)(1) (1994).
23. An earlier version of this no agency/no contact provision was a central reason for President
Reagan's pocket veto of the 1988 legislative revisions contained in H.R. 5043 (a more extreme
version of the legislation than the one that ultimately became law in 1989). See 24 Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents 1561-62 (November 23, 1988).
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or agency. The affected foreign entities were defined to be foreign governments or
political parties.
This ban has been extensively questioned both legally and as a matter of policy, as it

singles out particular types of clients for additional restrictions. The effort to adopt these
restrictions (which, at various times during the legislative activity, was also aimed at
foreign companies) began in earnest in 1986. The Senate Judiciary Committee favorably
reported such a provision that year, 24 and in favorably reporting the successor bill the
next year, sought to justify such singling out on the grounds that the concerns over misuse
of information or influence peddling were "more immediate," and "very disquieting"
when former officials are employed by foreign interests .25 The Committee defended restrictions on such representation as "necessarily stronger. -26
A.

LEGAL QUESTIONS

The 1987 Senate Report defended the new provisions (including the ban on representing
foreign interests) as consistent with the First Amendment's free speech and association
clauses, the Fifth Amendment's due process and bill of attainder clauses, and the Fourteen
Amendment's equal protection clause.
With regard to the First Amendment, the Senate Committee acknowledged its receipt
of contradictory testimony. Some witnesses took the position that former employees
would retain their First Amendment right to express their personal views and would
have only limited encumbrances on their ability to collect revenues for advocacy.
Further, they noted that there was no constitutionally protected right to profit from
such advocacy." On the other hand, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU")
argued that it was incorrect to relegate the affected representational activities to the
category of "commercial speech." Rather, according to the ACLU, they were political
activities meriting the protection of judicial strict scrutiny, so that any regulation must
be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling government interest. 28 The Senate Committee
ultimately concluded that:

24.
25.
26.
27.

See S. REP. No. 396, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-27 (1986) (regarding S.2334).
S. REP. No. 101, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1987) (regarding S.237).
Id.
Id. at 12-13. See Hearings on S. 2334 (Integrity in Post Employment Act of 1986) Before

the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 129-30, 134 (1986) (testimony of John
F. Banzhaf III, Professor, George Washington University School of Law). Prof. Banzhaf did
take the position that, if the ban applied to uncompensated advocacy, there would be a serious
freedom of speech issue. See id. at 145. In later hearings, Common Cause took the position that
it was doubtful that there was a First Amendment right to speak in a representative capacity. If
anything, speaking in a representative capacity was more of a question of freedom of association.
See Hearing on H.R. 4917 and H.R. 5043 (Restrictions on the Post-Employment Activities of
FederalOfficers and Employees) Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1988) (letter from
Archibald Cox, Chairman, Common Cause to the Hon. Strom Thurmond dated April 18, 1988);
Hearings on H.R. 2267 and Related Bills (Post-Employment Restrictionsfor Federal Officers
and Employees) Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 195-96 (1989) (statement of Archibald
Cox, Chairman, Common Cause).
28. S.REP. No. 101, supra note 25, at 13. See Hearingson S.2334 (Integrityin PostEmployment
Act of 1986) Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 195-97 (1986) (testimony
of Morton H. Halperin and Jerry J. Berman on behalf of the ACLU). The ACLU maintained this
position in later hearings. See Hearing on H.R. 1231 (ForeignAgents Compulsory Ethics in Trade
Act of 1987) Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the
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Even if the "strict scrutiny" standard would apply, the Committee believes that
S. 237 would be found constitutional. The legislation is supported by several compelling
Government interests-limiting the actuality and appearance of improper influence by
former Government officials and combatting the potential for misuse of confidential
information in a manner contrary to the interests of the United States. Furthermore,
the legislation, as amended, is tailored to serve those compelling interests. It imposes
"cooling off' periods on Government contracts [sic] of a scope and length suited to
the officers affected, and it proscribes employment by foreign entities for periods during
which confidential information acquired while in Government service would remain
both useful and memorable. 29
The House Committee was more certain that the strict scrutiny test would apply:
Because the proposed prohibitions implicate constitutional rights under the First Amendment, the test which the Courts are likely to apply in determining whether they are
constitutional is whether the prohibitions are:
1. Necessary to serve a compelling state interest; and
2. Drawn as narrowly as possible to achieve that compelling interest. Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1963).
Thus, even if the courts find that the prohibitions address a compelling state interest,
they will also need to conclude that the bans themselves are reasonable and are as
narrow as possible to achieve that purpose. 30
However, the House report did not continue with application of those principles to the
individual provisions of the bill. 3 '
With regard to the due process clause, the Senate Committee emphasized that the bill
did not absolutely bar anyone from pursuing employment. Rather it "merely imposed a
waiting period;" any negative effect on employment opportunities was outweighed by
the strong public interest in avoiding abuse of confidential information or influence.
This is in obvious contrast to the later lifetime ban now imposed on former USTRs and
Deputy USTRs.
With regard to the equal protection clause, the Senate Committee took the position that
the distinction between the various classes of individuals was subject to the lower "rational
basis" test. The Committee believed that that test was met:
Differences in responsibility and potential influence provide at least a rational basis
for distinguishing between former high level officials. . . and all other Federal employees. . . . Similarly, the distinction in the bill between representation of foreign entities
and representation of domestic entities is justified by the different effect these entities

House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 145-48 (1987) (testimony of Morton Halperin
on behalf of the ACLU); Hearingon H.R. 4917andH.R. 5043 (Restrictionson the Post-Employment
Activities of Federal Officers and Employees) Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 244-47 (1988)
(testimony of Morton H. Halperin and Leslie Harris on behalf of the ACLU); Hearings on H.R.
2267 and Related Bills (Post-EmploymentRestrictionsfor Federal Officers and Employees) Before
the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the

Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 200, 204-06 (1989) (testimony of Leslie Harris, Legislative Counsel,
ACLU).
29. S. REP. No. 101, supra note 25, at 13.
30. H. REP. No. 1068, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1988) (regarding H.R. 5043).
31. It did include an extended discussion of the constitutional issues surrounding "commercial
speech" and whether the representation was for compensation. See id. at 13-15.
32. S. REP. No. 101, supra note 25, at 14.
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might have on the U.S. interests, particularly if they acquire confidential Government
information ... .33
Thus, significant legal questions have been raised with regard to the 1989 general one-year
ban against representing, aiding or advising foreign entities. This ban is the foundation
for the special ban now placed upon USTRs and Deputy USTRs.
B. POLICY QUESTIONS

As importantly, numerous witnesses testified that whether foreign entities were the
represented or aided parties was not relevant to either of the central questions motivating
34
conflict of interest statutes: misuse of inside information or misuse of influence. In the
words of representatives of the ACLU:
If a former official is abusing his or her trust by representing an interest seeking advantage
from the government the abuse is present whether the entity being represented is a
foreign power or a domestic firm.3
Even Common Cause, which was in favor of the new restriction, had taken a position
more in line with the ACLU during the consideration of the senior official agency-specific
no contact rules adopted by the 1978 Ethics in Government Act:
Once, some argued that Government officials should be prohibited from going to work for
specific organizations or agencies or private groups following Government employment.
This does not do that. The 1-year ban which applies to top-level officials does not prohibit
anyone from working for any organization upon leaving the Government, and it doesn't
even prohibit the individual from working on those areas in which the individual may have
worked at with the Government. It simply says that the individual, for a period of 1 year,
cannot go back and work specifically with former colleagues and with the agency which
the individual just left. And that is a breathing period that is designed, I think, to reach
some kind of balance with dealing with the problem commonly referred to as revolving
door problem, leaving flexibility but also providing some protections against abuse. 36
37
The focus of the ethics laws should be on misconduct, not the identity of the client. Put
another way by a Justice Department spokesperson, what is the problem being addressed by

33. Id. at 13-14. One academic witness testified that "rational basis", rather than some more
strict test, would apply because there was no First Amendment freedom of speech or association
right being impaired. See Hearings on S. 2334 (Integrity in Post Employment Act of 1986) Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1986) (testimony of John F. Banzhaf
III, Professor, George Washington University School of Law).
34. See Hearingson S. 2334 (Integrityin Post Employment Act of 1986)Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-80 (1986) (testimony of David H. Martin, Director, Office

of Government Ethics).
35. Hearings on S. 2334 (Integrity in Post Employment Act of 1986) Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 198 (1986) (testimony of Morton H. Halperin and Jerry J.
Berman on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union).
36. Hearings on H.R. 1, H.R. 9, H.R. 6954, and Companion Bills (FinancialDisclosure Act)
Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 575-76, 591-93 (1977) (testimony of Fred Wertheimer, Vice
President, Common Cause, also distinguishing the aid from that covered by Section 207(a) where
the individual has specific information about the matter stemming from the government service).
37. See Hearings on H.R. 2267 and Related Bills (Post-Employment Restrictions for Federal
Officers and Employees) Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and GovernmentalRelations
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 210-11 (1989) (statement of Leslie
Harris, Legislative Counsel, The American Civil Liberties Union).
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special treatment for representing foreign governments? That witness believed that there
was no unique problem of information disclosure or influence peddling to justify the
restrictions. Further, the post-employment restrictions under consideration would prohibit
representations or assistance which the United States would find advantageous (e.g.,
seeking U.S. Government funds to combat drug production in a foreign country).38 If a
former official has influence to peddle, he or she should be regulated in doing so without
regard to whom he or she is representing.
Similarly, a State Department spokesperson (commenting upon a later bill) noted that
there was no necessary problem with switching sides:
[T]he prohibition is drawn so broadly that it covers general matters in which United
States interests are only indirectly involved. Even if this were narrowed, the problem
of "switching sides" does not appear to relate only to high-level officials or to foreign
interests. In a particular case, a foreign interest may be complementary to or supportive
of United States interests, while a particular American interest in a given case, ma4
be opposed to the interests ofthe United States government or other American interests.
Therefore, as with the legal questions, significant policy questions remain with regard
to the 1989 general one-year ban against representing, aiding or advising foreign entities,
which ban is the basis for the 1992 and 1995 expanded bans affecting USTRs and Deputy
USTRs. Proponents of the expanded bans have not demonstrated special justification for
this special "cooling off" period. The only defense for the 1989 rule is that, because it
is only one year in length, the inconvenience is minimal. Even that defense is unavailable
for the new USTR Amendment.

38. Hearings on H.R. 5097 and Related Bills (Post-Employment Conflicts of Interest) Before
the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-80 (1986) (testimony of John C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
39. Hearingon H.R. 1231 (ForeignAgents Compulsory Ethics in Trade Act of 1987) Before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1987) (testimony of Michael G. Kozak, Deputy Legal Adviser,
Department of State).
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